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certaintycase (see [9], footnote 15) the current market value of the




where the first two terms, as before, represent the capitalized value of
the current tax-adjusted earning power plus the tax benefits on debt,
and the last term is the contribution to value of the future growth
potential.
Despite the heroic simplifications invoked in its derivation, the above
expression for growth potential is still by no means a simple one. It is
the product of three separate elements: the profitability of the future
opportunities as measured by the difference betweenand C(L); the
size of these opportunities 1 —T));and how long they are
expected to last (T). None of these component terms is directly observ-
able, though some such as 1 —r)(and possibly p*) might be
approximated by extrapolating recent past experience. In this paper, we
take the simplest way out by focusing on the most tractable component
k1V( 1 —T),the level of investment opportunities, and impounding the
others in its regression coefficient.
As an empirical estimate of investment opportunities, we have used
in the subsequent estimating equations the quantity (1/5 —A/
A t-5).That is, we have used a linear five-year average growth rate of
total assets times current assets denoted for simplicity hereafter as AA.
This particular form of average, for reasons still not entirely clear to us,
yields consistently higher gross and net correlations with total value
than other simple averages we have tried. But the differences are not
large and the estimates of the other coefficients are not sensitive to the
specific measure used.
5. DIVIDEND POLICY, VALUATION AND THE COST OF CAPITAL
Under ideal conditions of perfect capital markets, rational investor
behavior, and no tax discrimination between sources of income, dividend
policy would present no particular problem. In such a setting, we have
shown [9] that, given a firm's investment policy, its dividend policy will
have no effect whatever on the current market value of its shares or on
its cost of capital; and that despite the impressions of some writers to the
contrary(see,e.g.,Lintner [7]),this conclusionisequally valid
whether one is considering a world of certainty or uncertainty. Dividend
policy serves to determine only the division of the stockholders' return
between current cash receipts and capital appreciation, and the division190 Financial Aspects
of the firm's equity financing between retained earnings and external
flotations.
The picture becomes considerably more complicated, however, as
soon as we weaken the assumptions to allow for the present tax subsidy
to capital gains and for the existence of brokerage fees and flotation
costs. Under these conditions, a firm's dividend policy can, in general,
be expected to have some effect on its market value though the precise
amount of the effect is impossible to determine a priori.
Given this uncertainty as to the size and, to some extent, even the
direction of the dividend effect, the indicated course might seem to be
simply to add a dividend term with an unspecified coefficient to the
structural equation (8) and let the sample determine its value. From
such a valuation equation we could, of course, also go on to derive an
extension of the cost of capital formula (7) running in terms of divi-
dend policy as well as debt policy.8
The trouble with such an approach, however, is that if it is applied
in a straightforward fashion, as in Gordon [3] or Durand [2], the result-
mg estimate of the dividend coefficient will inevitably be strongly biased
upward (and the key earnings coefficient correspondingly biased down-
ward). Since the precise mechanism generating this bias has been
described at length in our [11] and will be further referred to below,
we need not dwell on the matter further at this point beyond observing
that the difficulty arises from the widespread practice of dividend
stabilization. With current dividends based in large part on manage-
ment's expectations of long-run future earnings, the dividend coefficient
in the regression equation will reflect this substantial informational
content about 1—2-) alongwith the true effect, if any, of dividends
per se on valuation.
Because of this confounding of the earnings and dividend coefficients,
our approach here wifi be to omit the dividend variable entirely and to
focus on the problem of estimating the earnings coefficient (which is,
of course, to be interpreted as the capitalization rate for earnings for
companies following the sample average dividend policy). As it turns
out, tests of the dividend effect (presented in detail in the unabridged
8Althoughthe procedure fqr deriving the marginal and average costs of capital
in the dividend case is analogous to that for the leverage case, the derivation is
considerably more complicated.Further difficulties arise from the fact that, in
such a setting, maximizing market value is no longer always equivalent to maxi-
mizing the economic welfare of the owners. Since these and related problems are
largely peripheral to the main concerns of this paper, further discussion of them
will be deferred to a separate paper.Estimates of the Cost of Capital 191
version) indicate that itis quite small in this industry for the years
under study and can safely be neglected for our main purposes here.
6. SIZE AND VALUATION
All the valuation equations considered so far have been written as
linear homogeneous functions of the independent variables, implying,
among other things, that a given proportionate change in the values of
all the independent variables leads to an equal proportionate change in
the market value of the firm. The results of previous valuation studies
(see, e.g., Gordon [4]) suggest, however, that the true market capitaliza-
tion rate for the expected earnings of large firms may tend to be larger
than that of small firms in the same industry.
As was true of the growth effect, there are a number of possible ways
of incorporating this size or scale effect into the model. By far the
simplest is merely to add a constant term to the valuation equation.
The resulting nonhomogeneous equation must then be interpreted as the
linear approximation over the sample range to the underlying nonlinear
relation, and the coefficient of the earnings variable as the (constant)
marginal capitalization rate in the industry. The magnitude and direc-
tion of the scale effect would be indicated by the size and sign of the
constant term. A negative constant term would confirm that the average
capitalization rate is less than the marginal rate and hence that the
average capitalization rate tends to rise with increasing size of firm. A
positive value for the constant term, on the other hand, would imply
decreasing returns to scale in valuation.
7. THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL AND THE METHOD OF ESTIMATION
Our analysis of the theory of valuation thus leads to the following
structural equation:
(V— TD)=ao+ a1X(l — T)+ U, (9)
where a1 is the marginal capitalization rate for pure equity streams in
the class and hence the key parameter for deriving the cost of capital,
a0 is an intercept term whose size and sign will measure any effects of
scale on valuation, a2 is a measure of the effects of growth potential on
value, and U is a random disturbance term. Note that since the theory
implies that the coefficient of the leverage variable D is equal to the
marginal corporate tax rate r, we shall, to increase the efficiency of
estimation, so constrainit by incorporatingit with the dependent
variable.192 Financial Aspects
Least-squares estimates of the coefficients of (9) will be efficient and
unbiased only if, among other things, the variance of the disturbance
term U is a constant, independent of the size of the firm, and the dis-
turbances are not correlated with the independent variables. Unfortu-
nately, neither of these conditions can reasonably be expected to hold
in our sample.
As for the variance of the disturbances, one would certainly suppose
that the errors in a valuation equation, including errors in measuring
(V —TD), areof the multiplicative rather than the additive variety.
And indeed, check of the simple scatter of value on measured earnings
suggests that the error term is approximately proportional to the size
of firm. Any attempt to fit(9) directly, therefore, would be highly
inefficient and in our sample (where the largest firm is on the order of
100 times the smallest,) the results would be completely domjnated by
a handful of giant companies.
In the present context, there are at least two approaches worth con-
sidering as possible solutions for this problem of heteroscedasticity: (i)
dividing (9) through by (V —rD)and re-expressing the structural rela-
tion in so-called, "yield" form; or (ii) weighting each observation in
inverse proportion to the size of the firm and hence to the size of the
standard deviation of the error. The former leads to the estimating
equation
X(l-r) 1
=a'1+ a'0 + a'2 +u', (10)
V—rD V—rD V—rD
where a'1 =p=thereciprocal of the capitalization rate for pure equity
streams(or,equivalently, the "marginal cost of equity capital"),
a'0 =aop,a'2 —a2p,and u' =— p(U/V—TD), withVar(u')
approximately a constant for all firms.
While an approach of this kind has the virtue of simplicity, it suffers
from the fact that the 'variable (V —rD)enters into the denominator
of the ratios on both sides of the equation. This is not only somewhat
unesthetic—since we are, in effect, using V to explain V—but will lead
to biased estimates to the extent that (V —rD)contains stochastic ele-
ments independent of those in the numerator of the ratios. In the present
case, this will mean that the coefficients of the growth and size variables
will be too high (i.e., less negative) and that the estimate of the cost of
capital (from the intercept term a1) will be correspondingly too low.
Since(V —rD)certainlydoeshaveastochastic component—
impounded in the term U in (9)—and since we have, at this stage, noEstimates of the Cost of Capital 193
basis for judging how large the resulting bias really is, we obviously
cannot afford to rely on estimating equations of this form. We shall
therefore rely primarily on the weighted regression approach.
Assuming that the standard deviation of the error term in (9) is roughly
proportional to size of firm, the required weighting can be effected by the
relatively simple expedient of deflating each of the variables by the book
value of total assets, denoted by A. Our reason for using total assets as
a deflator rather than, say, total sales (as, e.g., in Neilsen [13])is
mainly that in the utility industry at least such deflated terms as V/A,
D/A, or X( 1 —r)IA have natural and useful economic interpretations





with uU/A and Var (u) =aconstant.
One question that immediately arises in connection with (11) is the
status of the constant term. Recall that we are interpreting the basic
valuation equation (9) in the original, undeflated variables as a linear
approximation over the sample range, with its constant term a0 serving
as a measure of the effect of scale on valuation. To preserve this inter-
pretation, we must, therefore, regard the derived deflated regression (11)
as homogeneous, that is, as being fitted with no constant term and with
the coefficient of the variable 1/A now measuring the size effect.
A potentially much more serious problem than heteroscedasticity is
that posed by the lack of independence between the disturbance term in
(11) and the independent variables, particularly the key earnings vari-
able X( 1 —r)/A. That variable is defined, it will be recalled, as the
market's expectation of the long-run, future earning power of the assets
currently held by the firm. Since it is an expectation, itnot directly
observable or measurable and the best that can normally be done is
somehow to approximate it from the firm's published accounting state-
ments. This best, unfortunately, is likely to be none too good even in an
industry, such as the electric utility industry, where there is substantial
uniformity of accounting conventions among firms, where there are (at
least in our sample period) no firms suffering net losses, and where
large, year-to-year random fluctuations in reported earnings seem to be
relatively rare.
The implications of these inevitable errors in the measurement of
earnings for the problems at hand are perhaps most easily seen by
expressing the underlying structure as the following system of equations
(where, to simplify the notation, we let V* =(V—'rD)/A,X* =194 Financial Aspects
7(1—T)/A =the"true" unobservable expected earnings, X =deflated
earnings as measured from the accounting statements, andi =1... m
stand forallother relevant variables(including constants, where
appropriate):




where someandmay be zero, and with the error terms assumed
to be independent of each other and to have mean zero and (constant)
variances and respectively. Inother words, the value of
the firm depends on expected earnings and certain additional explana-
tory variables; measured earnings are merely in approximation to true
expected earnings, the error of measurement being v; and lastly, at least
some of the explanatory variables are also correlated with (and hence
convey information about) the true but unobservable X*.
The equations above thus constitute a simultaneous system in which
and X are, in effect, the endogenous variables, and theare the
exogenous variables. It follows, then, that if we attempt to fit by direct
least squares the single equation.
=ax+ E+ u' (13)
in whichis regressed on theandthe endogenous, measured earn-
ings X, the error term u' will not be independent of X and the coeffi-
cients of (13) will be biased. More concretely, it can readily be shown
(see, e.g., Chow [1], esp. pp. 94—98) that, in the limit for large samples,




whichis less than the true value aandthe more so the larger the variance
of the error of measurement andthe better proxies the includedEstimates of the Cost of Capital 195
exogenous variables are for earnings (i.e., the smaller the value of
As for the other variables, the coefficients will be given by
V
'7w2+
and thus may be larger or smaller than their true values depending on
the direction of correlation with X* (i.e., on the sian of yj•10
Recasting the original structure in the form of (12) not only serves to
clarify the nature of the biases introduced by errors of measurement, but
also suggests a remedy, namely, an instrumental variable approach. For
reasons of computational simplicity as well as ease of interpretation in
the present context, we shall implement this approach by means of a
two-stage procedure formally equivalent to the two-stage least-squares
method of Theil [141. (See also Madansky [8].) Operationally, this means
first regressing the endogenous variable X on all the instrumental variables
Z1, thereby obtaining estimates g, of the coefficientsin(12c). From
these estimates, a new variable I is formed, defined asgZ, and thus
i.-1
constituting an estimate of X* from which, if our assumptions are correct,
the error of measurement v will have been purged. If X is then used in the
second stage as the earnings variable in (13) in place of X (and if the con-
ditions for identification are met), the resulting estimates of a and the
can be shown to be consistent estimates of a and thein the basic struc-
tural equation (l2a).
As for the specific exogenous or instrumental variables to be used, we
have already considered two, growth and size. In addition—for reasons
discussed in detail in the unabridged version—we shall use total assets, two
capital structure variables (D/A and P/A), and total dividends paid.
The above expression for the bias in the earnings coefficient was derived on the
assumption that (13) was fitted with a constant term. If the equation were fitted
without a constant term (and if, as we have assumed, there is no constant term in
the true specification), then the apparent bias will be considerably smaller. The
reason is, of course, that the bias, by flattening the slope of the regression, tends
to produce a positive intercept even where none really belongs. Hence forcing the
regression through the origin and eliminating the artificial intercept offsets some
of the distortion. The offset is only partial, however, and forcing the regression
through the origin cannot be regarded as a satisfactory substitute for the more
elaborate methods for eliminating the bias to be introduced below.
10 Note that even if some 0 (implying that the correspondingreally has
no effect on market value) its estimatemight still be positive if> 0. And the
b, might be quite large if y, is large and if the measurement error in X is substan-
tial (so that a is considerably smaller than Thisis, of course, precisely the
"information effect" or proxy variable bias we were concerned about in connection
with the dividend variable (see section II 5).196 Financial Aspects
III. The Results
1. THE VALUATION EQUATION
The two-stage least-squares estimates of (11) for the three sample
years are presented in Table 1. Since our concern here is primarily with
TABLE 1
Two-Stage Least-Squares Estimates of the Basic Valuation Model
















1957 16.1 —.280 1.36 .88 .057 .052
(.46) (.08) (.23)
1956 16.7 —.114 .896 .87 .057 .051
C40) (.07) (.21)
1954 19.7 —.244 .299 .73 .063 .053
(.45) (.07) (.18)
the cost of capital rather than valuation per Se, we shall not comment
on these estimates in any detail. Suffice it to say that the results compare
quite favorably in terms of explanatory power—as measured, for exam-
ple, by the ratio of the standard error of the regression to the mean
value of V/A—with those that have been obtained in other valuation
studies using very different (and to us, at least, very unsatisfactory)
specifications. Of particular interest, of course, is the behavior of the
growth variable. Future growth potential (though small relative to cur-
rent earning power and the tax subsidy to debt in terms of contribution
to total market value) apparently increased steadily in absolute and rela-
tive importance over this period and by 1957 accounted for something
over 10 per cent of total market value for the average firm in the sample.
For further reference and comparison, we present in Table 2 two
alternative sets of estimates of the valuation equation. The first is the
direct least-squares regression of (V —rD)/A on measured earnings,
with the constant term suppressed. As can be seen, the differences from






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































very surprising in the light of the suppression of the constant term.'1
The differences turn out to be considerably larger (particularly in 1954)
when the constant term is not suppressed and, indeed, it is only in the
case of the two-stage estimates that the constant term really does
approach zero. The differences become larger still when other tests of
the basic specification (notably those concerned with the leverage and
dividend variables) are considered.
The second panel shows the estimates obtained by direct least-squares
regressions in the "yield form" of equation (10) above. The main
drawback of this approach, it will be recalled, comes from the presence
of V —'rD inthe denominators of variables on both sides of the equa-
tion, which imparts an upward bias to the coefficients of the independent
variables and a consequent downward bias to the crucial constant term.
Since the direction of the bias is known, however, we can use equations
of this form to provide at least a rough check on the reasonableness of
the estimates obtained by the more roundabout, two-stage approach.
To facilitate comparison with the estimates in Table 1, a column has
been added showing the reciprocal of the constant term, which is the
estimate of the capitalization factor for earnings implied by the observed
constant terms in the yield equations. As predicted, the capitalization
factors obtained via the yield equations are indeed all higher than those
obtained via the two-stage approach. The gap between the two sets of
estimates tends to widen somewhat over time, but the differences are
never very large. This close agreement should remove any lingering
fears that major distortions in the estimates may somehow have been
introduced in the two-stage approach. At the same time, it suggests that
the simpler yield equations may still have a useful role to play in valua-
tion studies, particularly where the interest is mainly in determining the
direction of changes in the cost of capital over time rather than develop-
ing precise estimates or testing the basic specification as developed here.
2. THE COST OF EQUITY CAPITAL
Turning now from valuation to the other side of the coin, the cost of
capital, we show in Table 3 the estimates of the cost of equity capital
implied by the earnings coefficients of Table 1. For comparison, the
table also shows two other measures of the cost or "ease of acquisition"
of equity capital frequently used by economists in investment studies,



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ratio of the average price to the book value of the shares. Notice that
all three measures indicate a rise in the cost of equity capital between
1954 and 1957, but our measure indicates a steeper and more substan-
tial increase over the interval. The causes and implications of this
apparently lesser responsiveness of the standard measures will become
clear in subsequent discussion.
Insofar as levels are concerned, notice that the average earnings
yield happens to be consistently higher than our estimate of the cost
of equity capital. We say happens to be to emphasize that, under our
model of valuation, there is no "normal" or even simple relation to be
expected between the two concepts. The earnings yield for any company
is not a given fixed number for each member of the class, but rather
a function whose arguments include the cost of equity capital for the
class, the firm's growth potential, its leverage policy, and its size. The
sample mean earnings yield shows only the combined effect of these
different and, to some extent, offsetting influences.
3. VALUATION, GROWTH, AND THE COST OF EQUITY CAPITAL
Because of the distortions resulting both from leverage effects and
from the fact that the market value of shares incorporates the capitalized
value of growth opportunities, we must conclude that the earnings-to-
price ratio—which together with long-term interest rates is the most
widely used measure of the cost of capital in investment studies—is
unlikely to provide an adequate approximation.
The first of these distortions—that arising from leverage—could be
handled by falling back on a measure of market yield somewhat different
from the earnings-to-price ratio, though related to it. Let us suppose
first that there were no corporate income taxes. Then we know that, in
the absence of valuable growth opportunities, the fundamental valuation
equation, expressed in yield form, would be simply X/V =p.The ratio
of expected total earnings to total market value—which may be thought
of as a "leverage-corrected" yield—would thus provide a direct estimate
of p. In principle, any firm could so approximate its cost of equity
capital from its own company data, although, of course, as a practical
matter, a better estimate would be obtained by averaging over a large
group of similar firms so as to wash out any random noise in X or V.
When we allow for taxes and the consequent tax subsidy on debt the
picture becomes slightly more complicated, but a direct approximation
of pstillexists.The appropriate yield—see (5)—now becomes
— rR)/(V—i-D),the ratio of total tax-adjusted earnings to total
market value minus the value of the tax subsidy.Estimates of the Cost of Capital 201
This method of direct approximation breaks down, however, in the
presence of growth. The leverage adjusted yield will be systematically
too low as an estimate of p for any company with growth potential as
will be the group average yield for any sample that contains significant
numbers of growth companies. Nor will the movements of the yield over
time conform well with changes in p to the extent that the market's
evaluation of future growth potential changes over time (and, of course,
much of the short-term variation visible in share prices stems precisely
from this source). Some idea of how sizable the distortions of level and
movement of the yield relative to p can be—even in such a low-growth
industry as our electric utilities and even over such a short span of time
—is provided by a comparison of our estimates of the cost of equity
capital in the first column of Table 3 with those of the tax and leverage
adjusted yield, [(Xi — — rD)],in the last column of that table.
One somewhat surprising aspect of this comparison, already noted
above, is the relative stability of the leverage-adjusted yield series over









future growth potential and because of the sensitivity of current market
values to even small changes in projected growth rates, one would
expect the growth component in the denominator of the yield ratio to
be quite volatile, and hence that the market yield would tend to swing
quite substantially in response to these continuing re-evaluations. Some
idea of why this "normal" pattern did not obtain during our sample
period can be gained from Figure 1. The solid-line functions plotted
there are the basic value regressions of Table 3 for the beginning and
ending years, 1954 and 1957, expressed in ratio form as
V-rD
—_=a1+a2_ XT_rR
(and hence ignoring the minor size effect). The dependent variable is
thus the reciprocal of the tax- and leverage-adjusted yield; the intercept
a1 is our estimate of l/p; and the slope a2 is the coefficient of growth in
the V equation.'2
Notice that in 1954, at the beginning of the period, the market's
estimate of the growth potential of the industry was quite low. Because
theslope was soflat,theapproximate sample mean valueof
(V — — by the circled cross—differed only
very slightly from the estimate of i/p implied by the intercept. By 1957,
however, a striking increase had taken place in the market's valuation
of the prospects for continuing profitable growth in the industry. As can
be seen from the broken line—which has been plotted with 1954 inter-
cept and 1957 slope—this large revaluation would have pushed the
average value of (V —TD) / (X T — TR) upby nearly 15 per cent to
22.4 (equivalent to a yield of about .044)if no other changes had
occurred. But instead of this "pivoting" around a stable intercept of
our estimates indicate that a simultaneous and quite substantial
drop in the intercept took place (i.e., rise in the cost of equity capital).
So substantial was this drop, in fact (when combined with the slight fall
in the mean value of the growth variable itself), that the upward push
of the revaluation of growth was more than offset; and the mean value of
(V — —rR)actually fell by about 10 per cent.
Although these compensating movements in p and the market's
evaluation of growth "explain" the relative stability of the tax- and
leverage-adjusted yield during the sample period, the explanation may
12Theuse of the reciprocal of the yield rather than the yield itself is simply a
matter of convenience since the presence_of growth impounded in V would lead
to a nonlinear relation between (X —rR)/ (V —rD)and growth as measured
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strike the reader as somewhat paradoxical. Growth potential, after all,
is the opportunity to invest in the future in projects whose rates of
return exceed the cost of capital. One would expect, therefore, that a
rise in the cost of capital would normally be associated with a fall in
growth potential. There are a number of possible explanations for the
opposite behavior in the present instance, but discussion of them is per-
haps best postponed until we have first provided estimates of the average
cost of capital relevant for investment decisions.
4. THE REQUIRED YIELD OR AVERAGE COST OF CAPITAL
As emphasized earlier, the relevant cost of capital for investment
decisions at the level of the firm is the average cost of capital, p(l —rL),
where L measures the "target" proportion of debt in future financing.
The average cost is thus not a fixed number, but a schedule or function
whose arguments are p (which is an "external" property of the class or
industry determined by the market) and L (which is a matter of
"internal" company policy). Although the average cost of capital,
unlike the cost of equity capital, is thus in principle different for each
firm in the industry, we can get some idea of its value and behavior for
the typical electric utility by using a typical or average value for L. The
obvious candidate, of course, is the actual sample average of D/A for
each year, since D/A measures the average proportion of debt in past
financing and this proportion is likely to be quite stable (particularly
when averaged over the industry). Estimates with these values for L
are shown in Table 4, columns 1 and 2. (For notational convenience,
we shall hereafter refer to these estimates as using C(L) to
mean the function itself and C(D/A), i.e., without the bar on D/A, to
refer to the function evaluated not at the industry mean, but at a par-
ticular company's value of D/A.)
These estimates C ofthe average cost of capital are, of course,
always below the corresponding estimates of p (Table 3, column 1);
but the movements over time of the two series are closely similar since,
as expected, the sample mean value of Th/A'isquite stable. Notice also
that the estimates of p and hence of C(.WA) conform quite closely in
their movements with the average yield on AAA bonds in the industry
(Table 4, columns 3 and 4)—probably the most popular surrogate for
the cost of capital in investment studies. This conformity is particularly
interesting since the rate of interest on bonds enters only very indirectly
into our calculations, of p and and, as can be seen from
columns 5 and 6, the implied average rate of interest in our sample









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































aEstimates of the Cost of Capital 205
economic point of view, this parallelism between movements in p and
the AAA yields would seem to suggest that, over this short interval at
least, the movements of both series were dominated by factors affecting
the supply of and demand for capital generally. Changes, if any, in
investors' tastes for risk-bearing or in their evaluation of the riskiness
of this industry in relation to others were apparently not large enough
(except possibly in 1957) to cause any significant divergence of move-
ment in the period under study.
It is also instructive to contrast our estimates of the average cost of
capital with those that would be obtained by following the prescriptions
laid down in much of the traditional literature of corporation finance.
Essentially, these call for computing the weighted sum of the market
yields of each type of security, the weights being the "target" proportions
of each security in the capital structure. That is,if we let i equal the
earnings-to-price ratio (our/S), p the preferred yield (our
r the average rate of interest on bonds (our R/D), 1 the target debt
ratio, and 1' the target preferred ratio, then the weighted average cost of
capitalfunction under thetraditionalview can be expressedas
i (1 —1—1')+ p (1') + r (1 —r)(1). Where the target weights I and 1'
are computed at book value as is usually recommended (i.e., with
l=D/A and 1'P/A and (1 —1—1')=B/Ain our notation), we
shall refer to the resulting average as CB(D/A); where they are taken
at market value (i.e., with 1 =D/Vand 1'P/V and 1 —I—1'=
weshall refer to the average as CM(D/V), with unbarred values of the
argument standing as before for a single company_value and barred
values for industry means. Estimates of both CB(D/A) and CAI(D/V)
for the typical firm in the sample, using actual sample mean values of
i, p, and r, as well as of the book and market value measures of 1 and 1'
in each case, are shown in Table 4, columns 9—12.
As can be seen from Table 4, both the levels and the time paths of
GB (D/A) and(D/V)differ significantly from those of C (D/A).
The largest discrepancies arise in the case of the widely advocated
CB(D/A) measure, which is substantially below C(D/A) in all three
years and which shows only_a_very slight rise over the period. The
market value estimates, are considerably closer to those of
C(D/A), but they too fail to indicate the sizable increase in the cost of
capital which seems to have occurred during this period.
5. RECONCILIATION WITH CONVENTIONAL AVERAGES
To understand precisely why these three methods of estimating the
average cost of capital gave such different answers for the years under206 Financial Aspects
study (and why they are likely to continue to diverge for other years
and other industries), it is helpful to begin by showing how these esti-
mates would relate to each other in a much simpler world in which no
growth potential ever existed. In such a world, we have seen that the
ratio —rR)/ ( V —TD) —the tax- and leverage-adjusted yield of
the previous section—would be a measure of our p, the cost of equity
capital. Hence, from the standpoint of any individual firm, the C(L)
function can be expressed as
XT_T.R l—rL
C(L) = (1—rL)= . (14)
V—rD V 1—rD/V








Notice first that for the special case of L =D/V—i.e.,when the target
leverage coincides with current leverage at market value, D/V, the
function C (L) takes the value C (D/ V) —/V =CM(D / V).
In other words, if a firm's current and future target leverage is D/V, it
will get precisely the same estimate for its average cost of capital regard-
less of whether it chooses to multiply its current tax- and leverage-
adjusted yield by (1 —rD/V),to compute the weighted average of the
current yields of its outstanding securities with market value weights for
each, or to simply use the ratio of expected tax-adjusted earnings to total
market value. A similar equivalence of estimates (at least to a very close
degree of approximation) would also hold, of course, for economists
concerned with "typical" values for the industry and_using industry_mean
values of D/V and of the various yields, i.e., C(D/V)
Although the equivalence holds for individual company data and for industry
averages, there is one important case in which the equivalence very definitely does
not hold. This is the common case of the firm following the weighted average
approach of (15) or (16) with current (or prospective future) company weights, but
using industry-wide averages of the component yields so as to obtain more reliable
estimates. The trouble here is that the market yield on shares (and to some extent
the yields on preferred and bonds as well) are increasing functions of leverage.
Hence, for a firm whose target leverage is greater (smaller) than the average for
the industry mean yield will be an underestimate (overestimate) of its own yield and
the resulting average cost of capital will be too low (high). This problem does not
arise under our (14), of course, since (Xr —rR)/ (V —iD)is not a function of
firm policy (as isIS) but an estimate of the external, market-given parameter, p.Estimates of the Cost of Capital 207
Note also that if V equals A—which would tend to be the case if there
were no growth past or future—.then CB(D/A) becomes the same func-
tion as and, by extension, as C(L). In this special case of no
growth, therefore, all three company and industry-wide estimates will
coincide.
This simple picture changes quite drastically, however, as soon as
growth potentialisintroduced. The function C(L) must now be
expressed as
l—rL




where G is the market's current valuation of future growth potential.
Hence, as can be seen by referring back to (15), there no longer exists
any concept of L for which the function C(L) will be the same as
CM(D/V). Note also that in the special case in which future growth
potential constitutes the_only major source of divergence between V and
A, (DIA) =(D/V—G)so that our estimates of the average cost of
capital C(D/A) would be closely approximated by the ratio —
V—G).The actual sample mean values of that ratio (with G taken as
the product of the growth coefficient in Table 1 and the mean value of
our growth variable are shown in columns 13 and 14 of
Table 4. As can be seen, the approximation to C(D/A) is indeed quite
close in 1956 and 1957; but it is less satisfactory in 1954 where the
growth contribution is small, both in absolute terms and relative to the
other sources of divergence_between V and A.
Where the ratio — —G)isa good approximation to
C(D/A), it will, of course, also follow that both measures will exceed
CM(D/V) which,as we saw above,isgiven approximately by
—rP/V).As for the relation between the_popular CB(D/A) and







since the assumption V —G=Aimplies D/V —GD/A, P/V —G208 Financial Aspects
P/A and S —G/V—GB/A. Comparison with (16) shows that the
weights in the two expressions are essentially the same; but since
(VT/S)< —G),CB(D/A) too will necessarily fall short of
C(D/A) when growth is present, and the gap will be larger, the larger
is the contribution of growth to the value of the shares.
Once again, then, we see that attempts to infer the cost of capital
directly from market yields rather than by the more detailed, cross-
sectional estimating procedures developed in this paper break down in
the face of growth. Where growth is present, all the popular, short-cut
approximations will underestimate the cost of capital; and where the
market changes its evaluation of growth potential over time (as is inevi-
table in view of the nature of growth), the time path of the yield
measures may give a quite misleading picture of the true changes in the
cost of capital. In particular, in our sample it happens that the market's
evaluation of growth increased substantially over the period, thereby
causing the yield measures to understate seriously the rise in capital
costs that appears to have been taking place at the same time. As noted
earlier, it is somewhat paradoxical that these two changes should have
occurred simultaneously, since an increase in the cost of capital should
tend to reduce what the market is willing to pay for given investment
opportunities. We can perhaps throw some light on this paradox by tak-
ing a closer look at our growth coefficients and their implicit components.
6. A FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE VALUATION OF GROWTH
The growth term in our basic valuation equation (see section II 4)




where k is the ratio of investment to tax-adjusted earnings, C is the
average cost of capital, p* is the tax-adjusted rate of return on new
investment, and T is a measure of the length of time for which the
opportunities to invest at the rateare expected last. In the actual
estimating equations, we have taken as our growth variable an estimate
of kX( 1 —r), thelevel of future investment opportunities. Hence, if
one accepts the underlying model, the observed coefficients of the
growth variable can be interpreted as an approximation to [p* —C/
C(1 + C)]?'.
Now that we have estimates of C, the average cost of capital for a
typical firm, we can attempt some further decomposition of these growth
coefficients and, in the process, we hope, gain some additional insightsEstimates of the Cost of Capital 209
into the market's appraisal of the growth potential in this industry. In
particular, it should be possible, from what we know about past earn-
ings and about the regulatory process governing earnings in the industry,
to make at least a rough approximation of
An obvious first candidate as an approximation_tois, of course,
the current, tax-adjusted rate of return on assets, (XT— rk)/A. Such a
measure, however, is almost certainly an underestimate ofsince we
know that there are components of total assets—actually, of total lia-
bilities—that regulatory commissions systematically exclude from the
rate base.14 Some idea of the extent of this underestimate is provided by
our knowledge that during these years most of the state commissions
were still setting the "reasonable return on the rate base" in the neigh-
borhood of the classical 6 per cent. By contrast, the sample average
values of XT/A_XT rather than tax-adjusted earnings X( 1 —'r)being
the relevant earnings concept in rate setting—were only .054, .056, and
.055 per cent in 1954, 1956, and 1957, respectively. One simple adjust-
ment, therefore, would be to blow up each sample mean value of tax-
adjusted earnings by the ratio of 6 per cent to the sample mean value of
Yr/A. The rates of return thus adjusted, as well as the original unad-
justed rates of return, are presented in Table 5, along with the esti-
mates of T they imply.
These results would seem to suggest the following as the resolution of
the paradox described in the previous section. The observed rise in the
market's valuation of the industry's growth potential, in the face of the
sharp rise in the cost of capital during the period, cannot reasonably
be attributed to any compensating increase in the expected rate of return
on future investment. No sharp upward trend in earnings rates, adjusted
or unadjusted, is visible in the data; nor would such a trend be expected
in view of the regulatory controls over the level of earnings. What seems
to have been happening rather is that early in the period investors came
to recognize that the regulatory authorities were setting rates at levels
'-4Afurther word of caution is necessary because the so-called accounting rate
of return (earnings after depreciation divided by net assets) is not the same as the
ordinary internal rate of return when a firm is growing. This discrepancy does not
seem likely to create any very serious problems insofar as the valuation equations
or estimates of the cost of capital are concerned since in those equations assets
appear only as a deflator and since an explicit growth variable is included. It may,
however, raise difficulties for comparisons of the kind being attempted here. We
say may, because the p"inour formula is not the usual internal rate of return, but
the so-called "perpetual rate of return" (see [9], p. 416), and the relations between
that rate and the accounting rate of return have, to our knowledge, nowhere yet
been explored. We are indebted to Sidney Davidson and Robert Williamson for
some helpful discussions on this general point.210 Financial Aspects
that would probably permit firms in the industry to earn somewhat more
than the cost of capital on any new capital invested. The subsequent rise
in the cost of capital narrowed the margin of gain somewhat; but its
effects on valuation were more than offset by an increase in the length
of time that favorable terms for new investment were expected to persist.
The actual numerical estimates of the expected duration of growth
opportunities, as presented in Table 5, are not, of course, to be taken
seriously in view of the many approximations, theoretical and empirical,
involved in their computation. But upward revaluation of growth pros-
pects (or at least in increasing awareness of growth potential on the part
of investors) is very definitely indicated.
JV. Some Concluding Observations
As emphasized at the outset, this paper should be regarded by econo-
mists as a first step toward developing historical estimates of the cost
of capital relevant for investment decision-making by business firms.
It will have adequately fulfilled its objectives if it has succeeded in con-
vincing economists working with investment functions that there is a cost
of capital problem, that some of the major econometric problems that
have prevented progress in the area to date can be overcome, and
that the averages and yield measures of the kind recommended in much
of the traditional literature on corporation finance as measures of the
cost of capital are likely to be treacherous and unreliable.
As for the direction to be taken by future research, clearly one urgent
need is further testing of the basic, rational, behavior-perfect, capital
market specification. Some confirmatory evidence for the model is pro-
vided in our unabridged paper and further tests on the same sample will
be provided in sequel papers. But it would obviously be desirable to
have independent tests by others and on samples which are a little
fresher, both in age and extent of. handling.
Even after a basic specification is agreed upon, there remain numer-
ous perplexing problems of estimation, notably those connected with
the crucial growth effect.If the market's expectation of future growth
opportunities changed seldom, slowly, or only in response to movements
of other more readily measurable variables such as sales, profits, or even
dividends, then the task would be the difficult but still essentially straight-
forward one of extrapolation. In practice, however, the market's valua-
tion of growth potential often changes abruptly, substantially, and with























































































































































































































































































































































While we, and we hope others, will continue to experiment with the
extrapolative approach, we suspect that a somewhat more indirect attack
may. in the long-run prove more fruitful. In particular, instead of
attempting to correct for the elusive and changing growth component in
the value of growth companies, effort might be directed to finding and
identifying companies that the market seems to regard as essentially
no-growth companies—and growth here does not mean expansion, but
opportunities to invest large sums at rates of return above the cost of
capital. The search for such no-growth firms might proceed either by
further decomposing the growth term along the lines of the last part of
the previous section, with a view to finding the firms for which=C,
or by constructing scatters similar to those in Figure 1 for a series of
widely spaced years and observing which firms seem continually to
cluster in the near neighborhood of the "pivots." Once a sample of
no-growth firms has thus been obtained, estimates of p can be made
relatively simply and quickly via the leverage-corrected yield route dis-
cussed in section III. This approach, or variants relying on a judicious
interplay of time series and cross-sectional estimation, should enable us,
within a reasonable span of time and with a reasonable amount of effort,
to obtain a usable time series of the estimated cost of capital.
Needless to say, even these hoped-for time series estimates would
have to be handled quite gingerly in investment studies. It is not to be
expected, for example, that the desired capital stock wifi always adjust
quickly to the current level of the cost of capital. Because of the sub-
stantial decision-making costs involved, the cut-off rate or required
minimum yield on new investments is likely to be changed only infre-
quently by large firms (typically, but by no means exclusively, on the
occasions when external financing is contemplated). By suitably smooth-
ing or lagging the series, however, it should be possible to incorporate
at least the major changes in the level of the cost of capital that have
occurred as the economy has swung over the last forty years from boom
to severe depression, to a postwar prosperity widely regarded as tempo-
rary, and finally to a long period of sustained prosperity interrupted by
only minor recessions and with fears of major future depressions largely
absent.
Finally, we should like to stress once more that the measure of the
cost of capital described in this paper should prove primarily relevant
for the investment behavior of large corporate enterprises. For smaller
firms, other measures—including more conventional measures of interest
rates and of those rather elusive factors that may be lumped under the
heading of availability of funds—might be a good deal more to the point.Estimates of the Cost of Capital 213
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